

The Middle East economy

Oil & Gas, Construction and Iran







The Middle East: Towards diversification

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






The global crude-oil market returns to balance











Government budget cuts and fiscal deficits





Diversification in the GCC










Economic growth in the MENA region





■2015 ■2016 ■2017 ■2018 ■2019-23

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
Nominal GDP in bn USD **Rank Geography** 2016 United States 18.564 1 2 China 11.086 4.718 3 Japan Saudi Arabia 20 628 27 Iran 404 UAE 31 353 Egypt 287 42 52 Qatar 162 53 Iraq 160 Kuwait 57 110 Oman 67 71 79 Lebanon 53 Jordan 90 40 Bahrain 96 31

Sources: National statistics, IMF, IHS Markit Forecast



The construction sector

- In 2016: 2.3% total construction spending growth
- Between 2015-20: 3.9% total construction spending growth
- All segments will experience growth that averages above 3.5% over the next five years
- 2020-25: 3.5% total construction spending



Five-year construction risk

Sources: IHS Markit Global Construction Service





Upcoming construction projects











Project award	Re-announcing, postponing or cancelling of governmental tenders
Costs	Increasing costs for contractors due to design modifications
Payments	Late payments by government to contractors
Licensing	Lengthy periods for issuing construction licenses
Competition	Governmental entities competing with private sector companies
Information	Lack of awareness of government plans and priorities by private companies
Finance	Difficulty in obtaining financing coupled with high interest rates
Legal	Absence of a clear legal framework to manage public-private partnerships





Iran: opportunity and/or risk?



+ve? Nuclear deal -ve? Weak oil price


Key Macro-Economic Indicators	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Real GDP (% change)	4,3	1,5	4,4	4,6	4,7	4,9	4,7
Nominal GDP (USD bn.)	378	378	404	444	492	551	612
Nominal GDP Per Capita (USD)	4.835	4.772	5.049	5.480	6.012	6.670	7.332
Consumer Price Index (% change)	17,2	13,7	8,7	12,1	11,4	10,1	8,8
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)	-1,2	-2,1	-2,8	-3,0	-3,0	-2,8	-2,7
Population (mn.)	78,1	79,1	80,0	81,0	81,8	82,6	83,4
Unemployment Rate (%)	10,6	10,7	10,4	10,1	10,0	9,9	9,8
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)	4,2	2,4	3,7	4,0	4,0	4,0	4,1
BOP Exports of Goods (USD bn.)	86,5	64,6	77,9	89,1	98,6	108,5	122,5
BOP Imports of Goods (US bn.)	65,1	52,4	59,1	67,6	74,4	81,1	91,4
Exchange Rate (LCU/USD, eop)	32.140	34.105	34.951	35.895	37.215	38.431	39.623





Iran: already a player










Iran: The construction sector

• 2016/17: Total construction spending expected growth of 1.8% and 3.9% respectively

IHS Markit

- 2015-20: Construction spending at 3.7% CAGR led by the nonresidential structures segment
- 2020-25: Growth remains relatively steady with 4.1% CAGR mainly for infrastructure



Iran sanctions: Significant risks to JCPOA under Trump



- Although multilateral and UNSC-endorsed, it is ultimately a political agreement, requires Iranian nuclear compliance and US and EU willingness to suspend application of sanctions
- Trump:
 - > **tear it up** (US can do unilaterally through a UNSC resolution)
 - > re-negotiate it (Iran unlikely to accept one-sided US demands)
 - > rigorously implement it (high risk of escalation by US if technical issues or minor non-compliance)
- All options significantly increase the risk of JCPOA breakdown
- JCPOA implementation requires affirmative US action (such as renewing sanctions waivers) Trump administration has to take a stance
- Republican-majority congress opposed JCPOA, reducing Trump administration flexibility





Iran: Business challenges



STRENGTHS

• Iran likely to continue nuclear compliance, does not eliminate risk of minor violations

• Internal political consensus most likely when there is an economically-compelling case, such as in energy, petrochemicals, and auto, and when Khamenei and/or IRGC benefit

• Higher state stability compared to other regional states

• Preferential treatment of local firms, particularly those connected to Khamenei and IRGC

• Higher risk of politicization and discriminatory commercial measures affecting Western companies

• Residual sanctions, including US primary sanctions prohibiting access to US financial system

• IRGC's widespread economic footprint, posing high supply chain risks, as well as high risk of expropriation of competitors in sectors dominated by IRGC, such as large-scale construction WEAKNESSES





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